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ABSTRACT: While research on the educational properties of sound have opened up important 
pathways for research, there is a tendency to approach sound through meaning and information. 
This paper charts another tendency to explore sound as educational precisely because it resists 
our attempts at meaning making, thereby moving us from the process of understanding to the 
experience of thought itself. The force that guides this trajectory is that of timbre, or the nuance 
of sounds. I begin with Nina Sun Eidsheim’s, which aims to delink timbre from essence and 
identity by showing the infinite potential of vocal timbres. While Eidsheim surely weakens the 
link, the pedagogy she articulates remains within the drive to produce knowledge and under the 
aesthetic of the beautiful. To experience timbre’s pedagogical charge requires a move to the 
aesthetic of the sublime. To make this move, I link together Jean-François Lyotard’s writings on 
writing, thinking, aesthetics, and sound, which allows expansive conception of timbre and shows 
the sonic dimensions of writing and thinking, through which the writer suspends their drive to 
know and becomes passible to the timbre (or phoné) of the word.  
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Sound has always been a concern for education. From silence and dialogue to the role of music 
and song, the sonic dynamics of education and the educational dynamics of the sonic have, over 
the past decade or so, become a more explicit concern in educational research. While this work 
has opened up various important paths, there is a tendency to approach sound as meaningful. 
Sound is educational because it is a process of transmitting information from which we can 
express, interpret, attend to, and generate meaning. There is nothing objectionable about this 
tendency, but by reducing sound to meaning we miss experiencing the matter of sound. 
Accordingly, in this paper I want to chart another tendency to explore sound as educational 
because it not only resists our attempts at making meaning, but more importantly because it 
grasps us and disseizes or desubjectifies the educational subject. Disseizure is educational 
because it moves us from the process of understanding and generating knowledge to the 
experience of thought itself.  
 The primary charge I follow here is that of timbre or the nuance of sounds, the qualities 
of sounds that exceed our capacity to identify and know.  I begin with recent conceptualizations 
of educational sound, which thus far haven’t considered timbre as a pedagogical force, before 
moving to Nina Sun Eidsheim’s (2019) latest book on vocal timbre. Eidsheim shows the 
problems that arise from associating timbre with an essence or identity and from positioning it as 
a knowable entity. One’s vocal timbre is voiced and heard as an expression of an identity. To the 
extent that these identities are produced by oppressive regimes, such a voicing and hearing 
naturalizes and reinforces them. In response, she works to weaken the link between timbre and 
essence, opening timbre up to its infinite potentialities. By listening to our listening, we no 
longer ask after the source of the voice’s timbre, and instead ask ourselves why we are listening 
and hearing as we are. Her pedagogical proposal hinges on the deconstruction of timbre, which 
reveals that any meaning generated from timbre can be open to relentless questioning, which can 
generate new meanings. The limitless potential of timbre, that is, is revealed by the endless 
actualizations (names, meanings, and knowledges) we can ascribe to it. While this surely 
weakens the link between timbre and essence, it remains within the drive to produce knowledge 
and, as I later show, under the aesthetic of the beautiful. The moment of disseizure is ultimately 
eclipsed by a return to the subject organized along the lines of development. Lingering within 
meaning deprives us from experiencing timbre qua timbre, the infinite indeterminacy of a sound 
as such, an experience that takes place under the aesthetic of the sublime. 
 To push timbre’s pedagogical dynamics into the sublime, I link together Jean-François 
Lyotard’s writings on writing, thinking, aesthetics, and sound. Connecting timbre with literacy 
allows an expansive conception of timbre and shows the sonic dimensions of writing and 
thinking, which for Lyotard are always processes of listening. I begin this section with Lyotard’s 
distinction between modern re-writing and re-writing modernity. In the former, the writer returns 
to a zero point in order to correct errors, erase stray marks, expose faults, and generate new 
knowledges. In the latter, the writer suspends their drive to know and becomes open to the force 
of timbre, which suspends the mind and allows the subject to touch what he calls the clouds of 
thought. The rest of the paper continues to work through this distinction by focusing in on the 
form and timbre of words, or their lexis and phoné, and then re-writing Lyotard’s notion of 
modern re-writing to place it under the order of the beautiful. Here, the point isn’t to get to the 
truth but, like with Eidsheim, to produce ever more knowledge about modernity. By re-writing 
modernity under the order of the sublime, on the other hand, the writer is faced with the very 
ability to conceptualize, know, and understand, and as such is open to the matter of thought and 
timbre qua timbre.  
 This project reverberates with recent moves to problematize and decenter the category of 
the human, notions of human agency, and hierarchical binaries between subjects and objects. 
Here, the mattering of the human—and particular kinds of humans—comes at the cost of 
disavowing, discrediting, and eliminating other kinds of matter. Knowledge is crucial in 
producing, reproducing, and working against these ontological hierarchies, as we struggle over 
the borders between legitimate and illegitimate knowledges: what and who does or doesn’t make 
what kind of sense? By attending to matter, a range of scholarly research—from posthumanism 
to affect theory—work to challenge and reconfigure regimes of agency and what groups and 
beings can participate in knowledge production, as well as what constitutes knowledge, 
legitimate or otherwise (e.g., Mulcahy, 2012; Reddington and Price, 2018; Snaza and Karavanta, 
2015; Zembylas, 2017). In the classroom, this sonically takes the form of a struggle over what 
constitutes noise (nonsense) and what constitutes sound (sense), whereby the sounds of those not 
admitted the (full) status of agent are literally and figuratively heard as noisy, as too loud or too 
soft, incomprehensible, irrelevant, or inauthentic, and are variously repressed or excluded. To not 
just include these sounds, but to reconfigure the realms of ontology, epistemology, and the 
audible necessitates new conceptions and pedagogies of literacy, hearing, and listening under the 
sublime so that matter (including bodily matter) can appear on its own terms. 
 The problem with maintaining literacy and sound under the order of the beautiful is that it 
keeps education locked in the drive to identify, produce, and develop knowledge through 
grasping. In Poetics of Relation, Édouard Glissant (1997) writes that “the verb to grasp contains 
the movement of hands that grab their surroundings and bring them back to themselves. A 
gesture of enclosure if not appropriation” (191-192). Matter are positioned only as potential 
sources of new knowledge for pedagogy to uncover and make transparent, and the subject is 
positioned as that which is capable—and duty bound—to do so. With the sublime, however, 
matter in all of its opacity and the unknowability—the timbre of words—disable the subject’s 
capacity to grasp, understand, and to produce knowledge, opening the possibility of inaugurating 




In their editorial introduction to a special issue dedicated to forming a distinct subfield of 
educational foundations called “sound foundations,” Walter Gershon and Peter Applebaum 
(2018) observe that sound in educational research is most often used mimetically by, for 
example, using deploying sonic metaphors to describe or approach dynamics. As such, sound 
foundations, which is a deep and sustained conversation between the motely field of sound 
studies and educational research, has to move past metaphors and engage sound on its own terms 
through “sound methods, ways of using the sonic as research tools regardless of how 
understandings from the information gathered are expressed, as sounds or text for example” 
(361). Sound methods don’t elevate sound to the top of a new educational hierarchy, but rather 
investigate the particularities inherent in them.  
Sounds are, as Gershon (2011) elsewhere puts it, “educational systems” because they are 
“sensual data so rife with information that the listener can render often disparate-seeming sounds 
into embodied meaning systems” (66). Writing in the context of curriculum theory, Gershon here 
challenges the dominating tendency to approach everything—including sounds—as text. The 
sounds that prevent or inhibit such a reading are, accordingly, dismissed or framed as 
impediments, whereas Gershon argues that they “are indeed educational in that they convey 
meaning to the listener and systemic in that the listener places those meanings into conceptual 
categories that inform their understandings” (76). Sounds open meaning up through resonance 
(as any sound can resonate with anything) and reverberation (sound is always moving). As a 
result, we’re “fluxed,” and if we acknowledge this then “resonance suggests that any perspective 
is given the dignity of attention in that it (a) resonates with that person at that time and (b) for 
reasons they believe to be important” (Gerson 2018, 2). By tuning research into the intention, 
attention, and expression of sounds, we can better appreciate the political nature of listening to 
sound at the same time as we overcome the division between the emission and reception of 
sound and open education up to the blurred distinctions and outsides of our current frameworks. 
Thus far, literature that we might group under sound foundations has stretched 
educational research and practice in important ways, such as by investigating the aural 
dimensions of inequality and oppression, exploring teaching as a practice of conducting voices, 
and expanding our understanding of what voices are, and who and what “has” a voice (e.g., 
Forrest 2015; Mazzei and Jackson 2017; Schwarz-Franco 2018 Wargo 2018; Wozolek 2018). 
Additionally, educational research has pushed beyond the privileging of voice and the 
unidimensional Western conception of silence as mere absence, lack, and disengagement, and 
the corresponding privileging of talking and student voice (e.g., Ford 2014; Hao 2011; Zembylas 
and Michaelides 2004). Thus far, the sonic and pedagogical potential of timbre hasn’t been 
theorized as an educational potentiality. Given the relatively new status of both sound studies 
and sound foundations, this is unsurprising. While timbre is prevalent in sound research, 
including traditional music and music education, it too is often left unambiguously and 
problematically open. This ambiguity is precisely where its sonic pedagogical value lies, and 
thinking through the educational dynamics of timbre can enrich both fields broadly. The present 
article contributes to the burgeoning pivot around sound and pedagogy by considering these 
dynamics. By attending to the sonic properties of literacy—of writing, reading, and thinking—I 
approach literacy not as processes that can be grasped by sound metaphors, but as practices of 
listening and hearing that, as vibratory enactments, disable our ability to grasp. 
Relative to childhood literacy, Michael Gallagher, Abigail Hackett, and Lisa Procter 
(2018) have demonstrated the limits of confining literacy pedagogy to the “auditory 
comprehension of recognizable, representational vocabulary” (465). While the 
decontextualization and abstraction of literacy pedagogy from operations of power have been 
critiqued, learning to speak and listen are still reduced to the acquisition of the ability to voice 
and hear linguistic representations, the problems of which are most evident in early childhood 
given the prevalence and importance of nonlinguistic sounds. These sounds, they argue, “ought 
to be valued as part of children’s expressive and communicative practices, and as a vital force in 
how they forge relations with the wider world, rather than merely a precursor to words” (465). 
Children, in effect, can teach adults to unlearn our listening practices to attend to the vibrations 
that exist beyond any association with words and that are variable, ephemeral, and non-
localizable. Confining sound to the mere communication of meaning by, for example, teaching 
children that “water splashes and twigs crack” (469) attunes our attention to words attributable to 
specific materials only, instead of the actual vibratory and relational movements that exceed any 
particular object. Sounds are “a kind of everyday magic” that are “available for all kinds of 
actions, signals, meaning-making, power games, imaginative play, and monstrous fantasies” 
(480). Sounds here are still, however, raw materials for the imagination and the mind to grasp. 
Although the essence of sounds are opened up beyond language, they are still framed as potential 
knowledges for, and at the service of, the subject. My wager, however, is that sounds, including 
the sounds of text, are educational precisely because they are beyond meaning, and that to 
actually experience sounds we have to suspend our minds and become open to the passing 
charge of timbre. In other words, the pedagogical sonic force of writing comes from the matter of 
words themselves. 
 
The pedagogy of timbre 
 
Timbre is an elusive and ultimately impossible category that is approachable only as a present 
absence or an unidentified difference. Timbre is the difference that makes it possible for a 
listener to discern the difference between two sounds with the same pitch, duration, and 
intensity. In her study of vocal timbre, Nina Sun Eidsheim (2019) locates crucial political and 
pedagogical problems that emerge from our engagement with timbre, and specifically the gap 
between the potentiality of timbre and its particular actualizations and manifestations, or between 
the openness of timbre and the demand for identification and categorization.  
Eidsheim (2019) introduces this by way of the acousmatic question that the listener is 
asked: what or who am I hearing? This question assumes that we can discern an answer, identify 
a source, and generate knowledge about the source (person) and the sound (voice). Yet the very 
reason for asking the question is because we can’t formulate an answer; “we ask the question 
because voice and vocal identity are not situated at a unified locus that can be unilaterally 
identified” (3). She turns the question around so it is asked of the listener’s listening: “Who am I, 
who hears this?” (24). Timbre isn’t a knowable thing but a process. By naming and measuring 
sounds, we block the infinite potentiality of timbre by insisting on limited concrete 
actualizations. While timbre is an errant phenomenon that can’t be pinned down, it “is often used 
to make truth claims about voice and the person emitting the vocal sound” (5). This means, in 
turn, not only that (vocal) timbre is seen as a unique and genuine product of an identifiable 
subject, but also that the pedagogy of timbre—how we come to voice and listen—reproduces 
systems of oppression, to the extent that “the practice of essentializing vocal timbre is the 
unexamined foundation upon which racialized vocal timbre is maintained” (154).  
Both in formal and everyday settings, “we are conditioned to hear what we listen for and 
to assume that what we hear is indisputable” (50), so that when “we subsequently hear them, and 
because we hear them, we believe the perceived meaning to be verified” (51). This is most 
evident when there’s a gap between what we’re listening for and what we hear. One striking 
example she offers is of Angelina Jordan, a young Norwegian girl, performing a Billie Holiday’s 
“Gloomy Sunday.” The disbelief and shock that strikes the audiences (on the TV show on which 
Jordan performed, in the audiences where Eidsheim has presented her research, and Eidsheim’s 
own) is the disruption of the belief that the voice is an essential expression of a unique identity. 
Because Holiday’s voice has been essentialized as the expression of Black suffering and her own 
particular autobiography, it’s heard as an expression of a story of Blackness and her own story of 
hardships, tragedy, and so on. How could this young girl from Norway then sound so similar? 
The disruption is pedagogically powerful but also ambiguous. On the one hand, it can 
strengthen our commitment to timbre as essence. Here, “the listener holds an image of an 
original voice in his or her mind, comparing it with the evidence available as a more or less 
favorable reproduction with a greater or lesser degree of fidelity” (164). In other words, timbre 
as timbre isn’t heard. But on the other hand, the relationship between timbre and essence can be 
weakened. When we hear “both the voice of the singer at hand and that voice inflecting the idea 
of the imitated voice,” we should be moved “to question the very foundation upon which the 
assumption of vocal essence rests” (165).  The pedagogical task, then, is to listen to our listening. 
For Eidsheim, this pedagogy consists “of demonstrating that the practical experience of 
exploring more of the wide range of timbral potential inherent in each voice offers a perspective 
on any single timbre” (57) so “that every timbral quality or meaning may be interrogated” (58). 
Timbre itself, as a limitless potentiality, doesn’t possess or communicate any meaning; instead 
“any and all meaning is generated outside the form” (184). This doesn’t mean foreclosing the 
political, but rather holding politics in tension with potential. When we realize that “a collection 
of styles and techniques is distinguishable through one name, it may also be distinguishable 
through another name, and another, and another, and yet another” (193). The infinite potentiality 
of timbre is manifested through each particular actualization. 
 If timbre’s pedagogical force rests in its limitless potentiality, which can manifest 
through the limitless process of assigning words to it, then what is the relationship between the 
word and timbre? Chasing this question, I think, can not only intensify the break between 
essence and timbre and sound out new pedagogical potentials, but also help us lend an ear to 
literacy, to writing, reading, and thinking, thereby breaking the link between literacy and 
knowledge and returning literacy to thought. In doing so, we can escape the drive to knowledge 
and meaning that predominates in sound studies and even in Eisheim’s pedagogy. While 
listening to our listening by opening up the interpretations of timbre, we remain within the drive 
to produce meaning and knowledge. Timbre as a force without or beyond meaning remains 
inaccessible; so too does potentiality and, as we will see with Lyotard, thought.    
 
Re-writing modernity: Listening to the timbre of words 
 
Lyotard could be approached as a writer who writes in order to think about writing. In a 1986 
lecture series at the Wellek Library at the University of California, Irvine, he references how 
Claude Simon answered the question posed by someone from the Union of Soviet Writers about 
what Simon thought writing is, to which Simon replied, according to Lyotard (1988), “It consists 
in trying to start a sentence, to continue it, and to finish it” (4) Writing, in other words, is an 
attempt to go someplace through and with the writing, to try and begin, to try and continue, and 
to try and end. This attempt “constitutes thinking or writing in its ‘entirety’” (7). Writing is, for 
Lyotard, not synonymous with thinking but a practice through which one can access thought. To 
emphasize that one can only try to write intimates that writing is not an instrument to be wielded, 
a technique to be learned, or a mechanism to be mastered. It’s not a process of transcribing 
existing knowledge from the ear onto paper or screen or of formulating representations to reality 
competently. Nor does the attempt to write emanate from the will, as if there is an “I” who has a 
thought or sensation and is compelled to organize it linguistically to communicate it to others. 
That one can only try to write sentences means that the sentence is always incomplete. Thus, it’s 
not a matter of trying harder or writing better, but of surrendering to the impossibility of writing. 
This is not—or not only—due to the permanent disjuncture or difference between reality and 
language, the real and the symbolic, the unconscious and the conscious, or, in proper Lyotardian 
speak, discourse and figure, but instead to the very inability to think. Thought’s constitution will 
be gestured towards more throughout the paper, but at this point I’ll say that thinking is most 
sharply distinct from knowing or understanding, the latter of which come under the property of 
the mind and are the result of the subject’s grasping of data, and the former of which is an 
exposure to that which is beyond the mind’s capacities. 
 To approach the matter from the heading with which he is most commonly associated, we 
can go to Lyotard’s paper on “Re-writing Modernity.” The heading was given to Lyotard by the 
organizers of a conference in Milwaukee, and for him it’s better than postmodernity because it 
changes the “post” to a “re” and “modernity” to “writing.” Lyotard prefers the first change 
because it eschews any pretense to periodization, to declaring another end and another 
beginning, which is a definitively modern (and impossible) gesture. Indeed, in a later work he 
will define modernity as the endless piling up of new willed pronouncements of new 
inaugurating periods. The “re” indicates a return that is simultaneously present, past, and future. 
To understand his preference for writing, we have to appreciate his distinction between two 
kinds of re-writing. The first is re-writing as remembering. This is a modern re-writing through 
which the writer returns to the beginning of the text or the top of the document and begins again. 
One draft is finished and the next draft is begun. The point of modern re-writing, and the point of 
modernity, is to mark a new zero hour in which the mistakes, misinterpretations, and 
mystifications of the past can be corrected, and the unknowns can be grasped to produce new 
knowledge. By marking a new zero hour, we can get closer to the zero point of the truth, justice, 
equality, and freedom. Modern re-writing produces progressively more comprehensive 
knowledge, as drafts move along the progressive path from potential knowledge to actualized 
knowledge. 
 As opposed to modern re-writing, re-writing modernity is re-writing as working through. 
This re-writing is “without end and therefore without will: without end in the sense in which it is 
not guided by the concept of an end—but not without finality” (30). One tries to finish or 
complete the writing but can only ever succeed in ending it. Without the will to guide it, the 
writer here operates under Freud’s rule of free-floating attention, which “states: do not prejudge, 
suspend judgement, give the same attention to everything that happens as it happens” (30). Re-
writing as working through, in other words, is propelled not by the will but by “listening to a 
sentiment. A fragment of a sentence, a scrap of information, a word, come along” (31). The 
objective here is not to know or understand, but to think. The point is not to gather more data to 
write a more accurate representation, but to experience the forces that limit and mobilize the 
subject’s capacity to synthesize and even, perhaps, to remain as a subject.  
Modern re-writing is based on the progression from opacity to transparency, from an 
unknown known to a known known, while re-writing modernity is a non-developmental way to 
approach opacity as such. Opaque matter is not only incapable to being rendered transparent, but 
actually disseizes the subject. Writing is therefore an aesthetic practice or, as Lyotard will prefer 
to say at times an anasthetic practice, one that doesn’t come from feeling but from the surplus of 
feeling, a surplus that is felt negatively as a limit. Because of the dominant framing of hearing 
and listening as cognitive understanding (in which we listen for what we can hear), it might be 
helpful to follow the thread of listening that Lyotard introduced in the paper. Although Lyotard 
frequently equates writing and reading with listening and sound, or writes about the former as 
actions of the latter, the scattered and fragmentary nature of the remarks itself requires some 
working through. 
As Lyotard hints above, writing always involves listening, and just as there are different 
modes of writing, so will there be different modes of listening and sounding. There are, in other 
words, multiple “voices of voice.” A substantive categorization here comes from Lyotard’s 
writing on voices in the analytic scene, from which he draws on Aristotle’s differentiation of 
lexis and phoné. Lexis is the articulated voice, which “is formed by articuli, by little members 
deprived of signification in themselves, which can refer to the objects they designate because 
they are their arbitrary representatives” (Lyotard 1991, 128). This is the voice that literacy 
teaches children to speak and to hear to inaugurate them into the classroom community, in which 
the speakers and listeners agree on the correspondence between language and referent through 
constant interchange. To listen for lexis is to listen for inflexions of voices, or the degree or 
character of a voice’s divergence from an alleged zero state. The voice is that of an addressor 
who uses words to communicate information to an addressee. The analyst is tasked with 
uncovering the true nature of this information. Modern re-writing is a practice of listening for the 
inflexions of lexis to approach the zero point of the origin. The result isn’t merely a new draft to 
be rewritten, but a new end and a new beginning: “we’ve made a real breakthrough today,” or 
“you’re finding your voice!” The teacher is positioned as a subject authorized to either affirm 
existing knowledge or help the student produce new knowledge. 
There is another voice, phoné, that doesn’t inflect because there is no zero point of 
meaning or origin from which to deviate. Instead of varying by degree, it jumps. It’s not 
articulated or arbitrary, isn’t involved in the transmission of information, and doesn’t have 
senders or receivers. It makes sense and signals only itself. This, of course, means that phoné is 
hard to “articulate” because it is “supposedly inarticulate” (130). The phoné is the timbre or 
nuance of the voice and the word. As a timbre, it’s always indeterminate relative to any 
categorization of sound. It’s a singular emission of matter that isn’t concerned with reference and 
is impossible to locate within an order of meaning. As a timbre, we hear why phoné is difficult to 
articulate through writing. Because we can’t know it, we can’t properly hear it. 
Lyotard goes so far as to say timbre is mute. The root of mute, mu or mut, appears in a 
range of words that denote “the sound obtained by closed lips: to moan, to mutter, murmeln, 
murmerer, mugir;” mu even shows up in the word “word” in French: mot (Lyotard 1992, 130). 
For Aristotle, phoné is a property of all animals, and humans are those who have both phoné and 
lexis. With the former, we present presence, our affectivity and animality, while with the latter 
we communicate, exchange, and produce meaning. The reason why phoné is mute is because “it 
always muffles the lexis” (130), it always covers over and obscures meaning. With children 
(those who can’t speak lexis) and animals, phoné appears as phoné, and literacy is the process of 
repressing phoné to birth lexis. With the speaker of words, phoné appears most often within lexis, 
as that which “can infiltrate a given place in the articulated structure, a given linkage, without 
being heard, precisely without inflecting the good order, and thus without having to reflect it” 
(133). It isn’t heard because it’s mute and isn’t destined for an addressee. Literacy pedagogy is a 
practice of listening for the phoné of words, for that which can’t be heard so that matter can 
appear as such. 
The pedagogical mode that can make this possible is the technique of free-floating 
attention. Lyotard finds that Freud moved to this pedagogical mode in response to the 
problematic of phoné as it manifested in the case of Ernst, or the “Rat Man.” When Rat Man 
reports to Freud that his parents knew a thought he had, but which he didn’t articulate, Freud at 
first tries to reduce the phoné to lexis because he’s trying to hear the zero degree of the voice. He 
does so by taking up the position of the addressee in a position of knowing in order to put the 
rules of exchangeable discourse in force, so that Rat Man and Freud can uncover the truth. With 
the shift to free association, however, Freud loosens his role as knower and abandons his place in 
the exchange of lexis, which gives the timbre of the voice and the word a greater presence. The 
inaudible timbres appear in his notes during and after the session, which now constitute a re-
writing of the scene. “All writing,” Lyotard tell us, “is this attempt to bear witness, by way of the 
articulated lexis, to the inflexible phoné… a debt of affect which it despairs of ever being able to 
pay off” (138). The writer is no longer the one who wills the truth to master and know the 
formerly unknown word, and instead one who suspends the will and competency to receive the 
phoné. In the classroom, teachers and students are no longer trying to grasp the meaning of the 
words or their voicing to hear them, but to listen for the noise of both, a noise that is sovereign in 
its own right. 
It might appear that literacy is not about the transmission of information or the 
communication or generation of meaning, and is instead concerned with accessing that which is 
outside of and underneath representation. Yet this is no romanticization or infatuation with an 
excessive surplus. After all, Lyotard writes with language, and I’m writing about that writing. As 
Lyotard (1988) says in his Wellek Library lectures, we can’t approach thought through 
“aggressive autonomy” or “spontaneous fantasy” (19). And interestingly he criticizes one of his 
early books, Libidinal Economy, on precisely the grounds that he gave into the spontaneous 
fantasy “of inscribing the passage of intensities directly in the prose itself without any mediation 
at all” (13) that emanated from “the temptation of indifference” (15). Putting this sonically, 
because timbre is the sounding difference of everything except duration, pitch, and loudness, 
without the latter qualities there is no everything except.  
As such, we write not only with language but also against it. If we only write with 
language, we remain within the circuits of exchangeable discourse and knowledge. We can still 
generate new knowledge, of course, but we remain resolutely under the confines on 
understanding and, as a result, inaccessible to thought. Language and writing are both allies and 
rivals, and modern re-writing doesn’t constitute writing for Lyotard because there is no 
adversarial relationship; writing is totally submissive to language, and the subject remains within 
the grasping drive. Re-writing modernity is when one disobeys language to get beyond the pitch, 
duration, and loudness of words and into their timbre: “One violates it, seduces it, one introduces 
into it an idiom unknown to it” (Lyotard 1992, 89). We don’t write because we know what to 
say, but to think about what else there is beyond the said, and how it might leave its trace in the 
text. Literacy isn’t the practice of actualizing potential knowledges through new drafts and 
readings, but of trying to think by surrendering to the matter of words; of trying to let words 
disseize the subject. 
 
The sublime sounds of writing 
 
At this point, the question of who or what it is that writes with and against language remains. If 
writing involves accessing something beyond my ability to understand, then is it still “me” who 
writes? Lyotard says that writing doesn’t come from the writer’s will, but is there a force 
determining the movement of my hands on the keyboard right now? Because writing is a sonic 
process, it makes sense to frame it as an acousmatic question. The question of what or who 
writes, then, is one we ask of ourselves while writing. It’s a question that modern re-writing can 
answer, or claim to answer: I am the knower or seeker of truth. For Lyotard, it’s a question that 
can’t be answered because any answer would remain trapped within the order of meaning, 
representation, and knowledge. It’s not a question to answer, but a question to think. In his paper 
on re-writing modernity, Lyotard (1991) suggests in passing that writing happens “under a 
problematic of the sublime as much as, and today more than, more obviously than, the 
problematic of the beautiful” (33-34). This is a helpful way to frame the acousmatic writing 
question because the difference ultimately hinges on the role, presence, and composition of the 
subject and its relationship to grasping, understanding, and thought.  
According to Kant, a judgment of the beautiful is one of taste. A judgment of taste is 
disinterested (not based in empirical or practical commitments), purposeless (there is no need 
fulfilled), singular yet universal (we judge taste for ourselves but because it is disinterested 
everyone should agree with us), and without guarantee (there is no concept we can identify with 
it). Taste is therefore not knowledge but the possibility of knowledge. When we encounter a 
form that is beautiful, Lyotard (1994) writes, “it is as if the dissonances that divide thought, those 
of the imagination and the concept, were on the wane and left way open” (20). This openness 
accounts for the pleasurable feeling of the beautiful. In an encounter with the beautiful, we can 
only imagine how the object or experience could be given a concept, accorded a form, or made 
into knowledge. We experience the power of our faculties at play with each other. They can play 
because they are disinterested and not driven by any ends. The beautiful activates the 
imagination. While the beautiful is “only regulative and not determinant in effect,” the “activity 
is the activity of understanding, the faculty of determining” (58).  
I want to suggest that the aesthetic of modern re-writing, then, is the pleasure felt by the 
imagination’s confrontation with an unknown. We experience some excess in the narrative, 
which propels our imagination to consider the endless ways that it could be made into a new kind 
of knowledge. Because modern re-writing is “the activity of understanding,” there is ultimately a 
closure of thought through the production of knowledge. The writing subject is “in a state of 
infancy” (20) or is “a minimal subject,” “a barely subjective subject” (1988, 31), which becomes 
a subject when knowledge is produced and synthesis is attained. Modern re-writing is thus a bit 
different from Lyotard’s formulation. The goal there was to get at the truth such that infancy 
grows up once and for all into adulthood. When we move modern re-writing under the order of 
the beautiful, the goal is to get at as many truths as possible to keep in play the recursive passage 
from infancy to subjectivity. We listen to timbre, interrogate how we’re hearing it and why, and 
imagine its infinite potentiality by naming it repeatedly. 
Whereas the beautiful arouses pleasure from the experience of opening up the faculties, 
which activates the imagination, the sublime feeling is one of pleasure and displeasure, which 
incapacitates the imagination and the other faculties. The relation with thought to an object 
disintegrates. “Above and beyond the formal qualities that induced the quality of taste,” Lyotard 
(1994) says, “thinking grasped by the sublime feeling is faced, ‘in’ nature, with quantities 
capable only of suggesting a magnitude or a force that exceeds its power of presentation” (75). 
The sublime is absolute, which means that it is not relative to anything else, and it is therefore 
without measure. The beautiful is immeasurable as it is experienced, which is what activates the 
imagination to play with how it could be measured. With the sublime, however, we are faced 
with the beyond of measure. Faced with the sublime, we experience our inability to accord forms 
and concepts, to understand and to know. “This powerlessness,” he continues, “makes thinking 
deaf or blind.” We try to present the sublime through the faculties at the limit of our ability to do 
so. 
By approaching the limit, however, we feel the excessive surplus of thought and matter, 
that which can’t be accorded a form. In the sublime, that is, “thinking defies its own finitude, as 
if fascinated by its own excessiveness. It is this desire for limitlessness that it feels in the sublime 
‘state’: happiness and unhappiness” (55). This explains why Lyotard (1988), in the Wellek 
Library lectures, says that “thoughts are clouds:” because their “periphery… is as immeasurable 
as the fractal lines of Benoit Mandelbrot. They are pushed and pulled at variable speeds… One 
cloud casts its shadow on another, the shape of the cloud varies with the angle from which they 
are approached” (5). We can only ever touch thought; we can never know it. 
 Writing with and against language is a sublime experience because the writer uses words 
to articulate a thought but fails, and this effort and failure results in the experience of thought as 
such—thought beyond representation, knowledge, and language. While the infancy of “the 
beautiful allows one to hope for the advent of a subject,” the sublime “seems to put an end to 
these hopes” (Lyotard 1994, 159-160). Re-writing modernity is the experience of a radical 
passibility to the phoné of words, where their matter works over the writer (or reader, speaker, or 
listener). The writer no longer tries to grasp phoné, and instead the words’ timbres grasp the 
subject. Instead of a recursive state between infancy and subjectivity, then, re-writing modernity 
is the interruption of subjectivity by the force of childhood, the charge the suspends subjectivity. 
Asking the acousmatic writing question, we are stupefied: there is no subject to respond, nothing 
capable of synthesizing the meaning of the words, or of understanding the potentiality of the 
timbre. We can only be touched by it; matter can only pass through it. To be sure, writing isn’t a 
pure state of passivity, but passibility. Passivity is a state of inaction. One lets things happen. To 
be passable is to be actively passive: to try to listen for that which will pass through us without 
being heard. In writing against language, we try to become passible to nuances; we try to start, 
continue, and finish sentences. 
 
Becoming passible to the timbre of words 
 
To think through the paradox of trying for passibility, we can approach words and language as a 
relation between matter and form. Literacy is generally engaged as a process of giving form to 
matter: there is data that we sense or think, and literacy is the mechanism through which we 
translate this into form. Literacy, on this reading, is the reduction of the timbre of words to an 
essence and the contraction of thought to knowledge. The timbre of words, however, can’t be 
grasped by the writer, who instead must obey a demand for passibility. Listening to listening 
entails remaining within “an inexhaustible network linking listening to belonging, to the sense of 
obligation, a passivity I should like to translate as passibility” (Lyotard 1991, 178). In other 
words, this isn’t a passive state in which the force of words determines the movement of the 
body (hands, fingers, wrists, arms, backs) at the computer. This would remain within the order of 
the beautiful as there would be a fit between form (writing) and matter (words). Instead, 
passibility is an attempt to obey the mute timbre of words as they manifest through language. 
 Within a musical composition of notes or linguistic composition of words, nuance is hard 
to detect. What we have to try to do  is “suspend the activity of comparing and grasping, the 
aggressivity, the ‘hands-on’ [manicipium] and the negotiation that are the regime of the mind,” at 
which point “it is perhaps not impossible to become open to the invasion of nuances, sensible to 
timbre” (139). Timbres, he says, “are what differ and defer,” what “introduce a sort of infinity, 
the indeterminacy of the harmonics within the frame determined by this identity” of a word or a 
note (140). Within the composition as an actualization of music or language, timbres open up 
potentiality. For Lyotard, however, the point is not to name these timbres to show the endless 
meanings we can assign them. This would remain within modern re-writing and under the order 
of the beautiful. Accordingly, Eidsheim’s (2019) pedagogy of assigning timbre “another name, 
and another, and another, and yet another” (193) works to deepen and expand the grasping. The 
endless assignment of new names loosens timbre’s connection with essence but deepens its 
connection with knowledge and meaning. Timbre qua timbre remains inaccessible. 
 Instead of using the mind to create infinite understandings of timbre, the pedagogical task 
here is to suspend the mind, to enact “a mindless state of mind, which is required of mind not for 
matter to be perceived or conceived, given or grasped, but so that there be some something” 
(Lyotard 1991, 140). This is a shift from the drive to grasp what is happening to the experience 
of witnessing that something is happening, allowing the something to remain indeterminate. 
Timbre is that which deactivates the mind so that the “mind is accessible to the material event, 
can be ‘touched’ by it: a singular, incomparable quality—unforgettable and immediately 
forgotten” (141). The subject is disseized, and when the subject is recomposed there is only the 
feeling of a debt, an obligation to which the subject responds by continuing to try to write, to try 
to let thoughts disseize it yet again.  
Whereas modern re-writing is infatuated with the infinite potential to actualize, re-writing 
modernity is possessed by the duty to have potentiality work over the writer, language, and the 
words. It is not just that words can have infinite interpretations or meanings, then, but that words 
are matter. At one point, Lyotard proffers that they are the matter—and not the form—of 
thoughts: “Perhaps words themselves, in the most secret place of thought, are its matter, its 
timbre, its nuance, i.e. what it cannot manage to think. Words ‘say’, sound, touch, always 
‘before’ thought” (142). If this is obscure, and to me it is, then it is precisely a kind of sublime 
experience in which we’re faced with the limits of our faculties: we can only think about the 
matter of words, we can only be passible to the matter of words. We can never know or name 
their matter.  
Instead of only asking after the different potential meanings timbre can take, then, such a 
pedagogy asks teachers and students to listen for the beyond of meaning, for what we can’t hear 
in a word or a sound, a text or a voice. Instead of being charged with interpretation, in which the 
mind tries to grasp matter according to existing knowledges or in order to produce new 
knowledges, when pedagogy is subjected to timbre we’re confronted with our inability to accord 
matter a representation, assign it a category, or subsume it under a knowledge. Matter appears as 
a pedagogical agent on its own terms, disseizing the subject, disabling the grasping drive, and, 
hopefully, inaugurating a new non-hierarchical audible field. Yet this doesn’t entail an eclipse of 
identity, as if a new audible field could be generated outside of the material conditions of the 
present. As such, the acousmatic questions, “What or who am I hearing” and “Who am I who 
hears this”—both of which lead to the identification of the sonic and the subject in ways that can 
either re-entrench existing orders or reveal the infinite potentiality of timbre—are supplemented 
by another set: “What or who am I not hearing,” “How can these inaudible sounds appear?” 
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